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ABSTRACT
Between 1993 and 1998 Congress considered many proposals that aimed to increase or
improve the use of risk analysis by federal agencies, especially in developing environmental
rules.  This report describes differences and similarities among selected provisions of key
proposals: Senate-passed Johnston amendments to S. 171 and S. 2019 in the 103  Congress;rd
S. 343, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, in the 104  Congress; House-passedth
H.R. 9 in the 104  Congress;  S. 981, as reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs,th
in the 105  Congress, and S. 1728, as introduced, in the 105  Congress.  This report will notth th
be updated.  Issues related to EPA's use of risk analysis are analyzed in CRS Report 98-618,
Environmental Risk Analysis: A Review of Public Policy Issues.  For current information
about legislation, see CRS Issue Brief 94036, The Role of Risk Analysis and Risk
Management in Environmental Protection.  For a broader look at regulatory reform
initiatives targeting environmental regulations, see CRS Report 96-949, Environmental
Reauthorizations and Regulatory Reform: From the 104  Congress to the 106th.th
Environmental Risk and Cost-Benefit Analysis:  
A Review of Proposed Legislative Mandates, 1993-1998
Summary
Between 1993 and 1998 Congress considered many different proposals that
aimed to increase or improve the use of risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis by
federal agencies, especially in developing environmental rules.  Key proposals include:
the Senate-approved Johnston amendments to S. 171, a bill to confer cabinet-level
status on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and to S. 2019, a bill to
reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water Act, in the 103  Congress; S. 343, as reportedrd
by the Committee on the Judiciary, in the 104  Congress; Divisions C and D of H.R.th
9, as passed by the House, in the 104  Congress; S. 981, as reported by theth
Committee on Governmental Affairs, in the 105  Congress; and S. 1728, asth
introduced, in the 105  Congress. th
From the 103  to the 105  Congress, proposals broadened in scope tord th
encompass more federal agencies and more kinds of agency activities.  At the same
time, recent proposals apply to a smaller fraction of promulgated rules that are
“major,” rather than to all final rules.  All highlighted proposals mandate risk analysis
when environmental regulations are promulgated, and the specificity of proposed
requirements grew in each Congress.  Similarly, all the highlighted bills, with one
exception, mandate analysis of the costs and benefits of some new rules, and these
requirements have been elaborated in each consecutive Congress.  
Most of the six highlighted bills would have established economic criteria for
evaluating and choosing among regulatory options.  Four of the six bills would have
directed agencies to promulgate cost-effective rules.  Four bills also would have
advised or required that benefits of a rule should justify its cost.  Other proposed
criteria included: flexibility to regulated entities and governments, net benefits,
incremental costs and benefits, and costs. However, only the bills of the 104th
Congress explicitly would have prohibited promulgation of a rule unless economic
criteria were met.  
Three of the highlighted proposals would have directed the executive branch to
coordinate and oversee regulatory analyses by agencies, but limited the time for
review and required public disclosure of relevant communications with the regulatory
agency and others outside of the federal government.  Two of these bills also would
have required peer review to ensure the quality of agencies’ analytic work.  All
highlighted Senate bills in the 104  and 105  Congresses would have suspendedth th
deadlines to facilitate agency compliance with analytic requirements for rules.  Most
of those bills would have required agencies to review existing major rules, as well as
newly promulgated rules.  Other provisions of bills in the 104  Congress that wouldth
have authorized citizen petitions and judicial review or required risk-based budgeting
were eliminated or modified in bills of the 105  Congress.  th
Proposed mandates for risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis of environmental
rules became more complex after the 103  Congress, as they included morerd
exceptions and caveats for analytic requirements and decision rules,  as well as more
mechanisms to ensure the quality of analyses.  
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“Environmental risk analysis” refers to any quantitative or qualitative scientific1
description of an environmental hazard, the potential adverse effects of exposure, the risks of
these effects, events and conditions that may lead to or modify adverse effects, populations
or environments that influence or experience adverse effects, and uncertainties with regard to
any of these factors.  For a more detailed definition, see the Appendix to CRS Report 98-618,
Environmental Risk Analysis: A Review of Public Policy Issues.
Environmental Risk and Cost-Benefit Analysis:
A Review of Proposed Legislative Mandates,
1993-1998
Introduction
The 103 , 104 , and 105  Congresses considered whether to require riskrd th th
analysis  of environmental regulatory proposals by the U.S. Environmental Protection1
Agency (EPA) and other agencies.  The House and Senate each approved at least one
such proposal (see below).  But, so far no Congress has enacted a requirement for
risk analysis that would change the way all environmental (or health and safety)
regulations are developed.  It is not clear whether any comprehensive requirement for
risk analysis of environmental regulations will be considered by the 106  Congress.th
Some believe that more recently evolved proposals lack most of the provisions that
historically have been stumbling blocks to passage, and they see a gathering
momentum for a legislative mandate.  Others see waning congressional  interest.  
At some point, however, Congress is expected to debate again an overarching
mandate for risk analysis of environmental regulations.  Many believe that
environmental programs could be more efficient and flexible, and less costly to the
regulated community, if EPA considered the results of risk analysis. Others disagree,
arguing that such analyses use scarce agency resources, delay rulemaking, and force
decisions to conform to the analytic results, regardless of the quality of underlying
data and models.  The issues and legislative options surrounding the use of risk
analysis at EPA are described and analyzed in CRS Report 98-618, Environmental
Risk Analysis: A Review of Public Policy Issues.  
Proposed mandates for risk analysis must be considered in the context of
existing and perhaps past mandates, as well as agencies’ practices.  Executive orders,
environmental statutes, and other provisions of law authorizing, mandating, or
constraining EPA’s use of risk analysis are discussed in CRS Report 98-619, Risk
Analysis: Background on Environmental Protection Agency Mandates.   
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This report describes and compares selected provisions related to risk analysis
in key legislative proposals introduced from the 103  through the 105  Congresses,rd th
including: 
! the Johnston amendments to S. 171, a bill to confer cabinet-level status on the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and to S. 2019, a bill to reauthorize
the Safe Drinking Water Act, both as passed by the Senate in the 103rd
Congress; 
! S. 343, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, in the 104  Congress;th
! Divisions C and D of H.R. 9, as passed by the House, in the 104  Congress;th
! S. 981, as reported by the Committee on Governmental Affairs, in the 105th
Congress, and 
! S. 1728, as introduced, in the 105  Congress.  th
The comparison emphasizes differences among provisions related to risk analysis and
cost-benefit analysis and mechanisms such as judicial review or peer review that make
agencies more accountable for the quality of such analyses. 
This report focuses on the general provisions of highlighted sections of bills
that are large and complex; specific provisions that modify the general requirements
of the highlighted sections may be omitted. 
Key Legislative Proposals
103  Congressrd
More than a dozen bills and amendments on environmental risk analysis were
introduced in the 103rd Congress.  One, P.L. 103-354, was enacted, but it applied
only to the Department of Agriculture.  Nine other bills were passed by one chamber
or reported by the committees of jurisdiction.  
Arguably, the most influential risk proposals in the 103  Congress were tword
amendments offered by Senator J. Bennett Johnston.  The original “Johnston
amendment” was the first risk legislation debated on the Senate floor, and it was
adopted on April 29, 1993, by a vote of 95 to 3.  The amendment was incorporated
as Section 123 in S. 171, a bill to raise the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to department (cabinet) status.  In the House, a proposal to similarly amend
a bill to elevate EPA to the cabinet (H.R. 3425) was unsuccessful, however.  The rule
for consideration of the reported House bill was defeated on the floor, reportedly in
part because the rule would have prevented introduction of non-germane
amendments, such as one on risk and cost-benefit analysis.  
During the second session of the 103rd Congress, Senator Johnston addressed
some of the key concerns of Members when he introduced a revised version of his
amendment.  It was adopted by the Senate during the May 18, 1994 floor debate on
Senate-passed S. 2019, a bill to amend and reauthorize the Safe Drinking Water Act.
The amendment became Section 18 of the Senate-passed bill.  Section 15, S. 2019,
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as passed by the Senate, also included a revised version of a bill originally introduced
by Senator Moynihan (S. 110) that would have required EPA to rank pollution
sources based on risk.  These bills did not receive House action.
104  Congressth
 Three risk-related bills were reported to the Senate in the 104  Congress (S.th
291, S. 333, and S. 343).  In June, 1995, they were merged and introduced on the
Senate floor by Senator Dole as a substitute amendment for S. 343, as reported by the
Committee on the Judiciary.  After two weeks of debate and three failed votes to
invoke cloture, the Senate turned to other issues.  The reported bill (also known as
the Dole bill), rather than the substitute amendment, is summarized in this report.  
The House Republican Contract with America promised that within the first
100 days of the 104th Congress risk legislation would be introduced, debated, and
voted upon in the House.  Title III of the “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act
of 1995" (JCWEA), one of the draft bills distributed with the House Republican
contract, appeared to integrate several of the proposals related to risk analysis that
saw action in the 103rd Congress, including a slightly modified version of the original
Johnston amendment, with coverage expanded beyond EPA to include all federal
agencies that promulgate regulations concerning human health and safety or the
environment.  The House amended and passed these provisions in H.R. 9 on March
3, 1995.  
H.R. 9, as passed by the House, contained four divisions, A through D.  Each
division contained the text of a bill that had passed the House prior to consideration
of H.R. 9.  Division C and Division D had provisions related to risk analysis.  Division
C contained the text of H.R. 926, the Regulatory Reform and Relief Act, while
Division D had the text of H.R. 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995.  The Senate did not act on H.R. 9.
Although the 104  Congress adjourned without enacting comprehensiveth
requirements for risk analysis, Congress did enact risk-based provisions included in
major legislation addressing drinking water (P.L. 104-182) and food safety (P.L. 104-
170), as well as requirements for economic analysis, which for environmental
regulations requires some analysis of risks as a basis for calculating risk reduction
benefits (P.L. 104-4; P.L. 104-121, Title II).  None of these mandates for risk analysis
is compared in this report.  
105  Congressth
The 105  Congress considered various proposals that would have mandatedth
analysis of environmental risks, but adjourned without enacting comprehensive
regulatory reform legislation or other provisions that would have increased use of risk
analysis by EPA.  The most comprehensive bill, S. 981,  as reported by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, had bipartisan support (S. Rept. 105-188), but
also faced significant opposition.  The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
reported S. 981, the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, amended, on May 11,
1998, but the bill received no floor action.  The Majority Leader introduced a risk-
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President Reagan issued the first explicit mandate for regulatory risk analysis in2
January 1985.  For more information about the requirements of executive orders, see CRS
Report 98-619, Risk Analysis: Background on Environmental Protection Agency Mandates.
S. 1728, like the Johnston amendment to S. 171 in the 103  Congress, targets only3 rd
rules for which the primary purpose is to address health, safety, or environmental risks.   
“Risk characterization” is the final step in a risk analysis, which summarizes scientific4
judgments about the existence and overall magnitude (that is, the incidence) of adverse effects,
given specified levels of exposure to a hazard.  
only version of S. 981, S. 1728, that would have applied only to proposed and final
regulations to protect health, safety, or the environment with a potential annual cost
to the economy of $100 million or more.  
Comparison of Selected Provisions
In general, bills mandating risk analysis have become more complex and
detailed since 1993.  Table 2 summarizes selected provisions of key bills in the 103 ,rd
104 , and 105  Congresses, beginning on page 11th th
  
Applicability
From the 103  Congress to the 104  Congress, proposed mandates for riskrd th
analysis in the federal government have broadened in scope to encompass more
agencies. The Johnston amendments would have mandated risk analysis only by EPA,
while proposals in the 104  Congress would have targeted all federal agencies,th
including the independent boards and commissions which, unlike other federal
agencies, have never been required by executive order to perform risk analysis or
economic analysis for proposed or final rules.   2
It is not clear whether bills in the 105  Congress would have required moreth
or fewer risk analyses and economic analyses by individual agencies than those in the
104  Congress.  The Johnston amendment to S. 171 would have applied only to finalth
rules that related to human health and safety or the environment, while later legislation
would have mandated analysis of proposed as well as final rules, and (with the
exception of S. 1728 in the 105  Congress) would have covered rules for anyth
regulatory purpose.  3
Moreover, although the proposed bills generally would have affected all
substantive rulemaking (that is, rule development for all rules covered by the notice
and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act), some proposals in
the 104  and 105  Congresses would have affected additional activities.  For example,th th
under S. 343, risk analyses not connected with rulemaking would have been affected
as well as interpretive rules or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice,
if they had altered or created rights or obligations of persons.  Similarly, S. 981 would
have affected risk characterizations in risk assessment documents and agency
decisions, as well as regulatory proposals.   S. 1728 would have required analyses4
when a significant substitution risk resulted from promulgation of a rule.
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The language used to define a “major rule” is precise and meaningful.  Note that the5
number of rules with an “effect on the national economy” of a certain monetary value is likely
to be much greater than the number of rules with a “cost” of equal value.
Proposals in the 104th and 105th Congresses would have applied only to rules
with a “major” or “significant” impact on the economy, health, the environment, or
public policy.  In contrast, the Johnston amendment to S. 171 in the 103  Congressrd
applied regardless of the impact of a rule.  Under the Johnston amendment to Senate-
passed S. 2019, analysis would be required only for rules with an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more.  In the 104  Congress, S. 343 and H.R. 9 Divisionth
C would have applied to rules with an estimated cost of $50 million or more in a year,
while H.R. 9 Division D would have affected rules likely to cost $25 million or more.
In the 105  Congress, both S. 981, as reported, and  S. 1728, as introduced, wouldth
have applied to rules likely to have a gross annual cost of $100 million or more.  
Definitions of “major rules” and “significant risk assessments” also varied in
the amount of discretion they would have provided to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to designate rules as major or non-major.  Rules likely to result in
major increases in costs or prices or significant adverse effects on economic activity
could have been designated as major under any of the legislative proposals in the 104th
and 105  Congresses.   The Senate bills during this period also would have authorizedth 5
designation of a rule as major due to its effects on health, safety, or the environment.
S. 981 would have given OMB the authority to require a  risk analysis to comply with
proposed requirements.  
  
All of the proposed mandates, except the Johnston amendments, authorized
exemptions for certain types of rules.  For example, S. 343, H.R. 9 Divisions C and
D, S. 981, and S. 1728 would have provided for emergencies, while S. 343, H.R. 9
Division D, and S. 981 would have exempted from risk analysis requirements rules
approving product labels (e.g., for pharmaceutical drugs).  S. 171 and S. 2019 would
have required EPA to perform the analyses or to report the reasons for
noncompliance in the Federal Register and to Congress.
Analytic Requirements
All of the proposals would have required agencies to analyze risks when they
are developing rules, generally before the risk is addressed by the regulation, relative
to other risks that could be addressed, and after a risk is managed under the rule to
estimate the incremental amount of risk reduction that might be achieved.  For
example, the Johnston amendment to S. 171 would have required analyses of:
! risks to individuals addressed by the regulation; 
! the health and environmental effects of the regulation; and 
! risks addressed compared to other risks.
S. 2019 added a requirement to analyze risks to “significant subpopulations
disproportionately exposed or particularly sensitive.”  It also explicitly required
qualitative analysis as well as quantitative analysis of risks.  
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The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4) requires federal agencies to analyze6
costs and benefits of all proposed and final rules with an expected cost of $100 million or
more.
H.R. 9 and S. 343, as reported in the 104  Congress, would have includedth
requirements to analyze uncertainties, assumptions,  the distribution of risk in a
population (that is, who is at risk), substitution risks (risks resulting from regulation),
and the likelihood that exposure to risks would occur.  All these analytic requirements
were included in S. 981 (105th Congress).  
Beginning in the 104  Congress, proposals specified certain principles of riskth
analysis to which covered agency analyses and presentations of results would be
required to conform.  The bills proposed various means of estimating and then
expressing risk: in the 104  Congress, agencies would have been directed to useth
“plausible” or “unbiased” models and to present a “best estimate”; S. 981 would have
mandated a “weight of scientific evidence” approach and expression of a central and
high end risk estimate; and S. 1728 would have required public input and statement
of the “most plausible” risk estimates.
Analysis of costs and benefits would have been mandated by all the highlighted
bills (except the bill introduced by Senator Lott late in the 105  Congress), but theth
bills differed in how they would have directed agencies to relate costs and benefits.6
Both versions of the Johnston amendments (103  Congress) and S. 343 (104rd th
Congress) would have required consideration of whether benefits would justify costs.
S. 343 and S. 981 (105  Congress) would have mandated analysis of net benefitsth
explicitly.  S. 2019 and S. 981 in the 105  Congress also would have required a cost-th
effectiveness analysis.  
Additional elements of economic analysis were added to bills in the 104th
Congress.  Both S. 343 and H.R. 9 would have required analysis of the distribution
of costs and benefits, incremental costs and benefits,  effects on small businesses, and
the cumulative cost to the regulated community and comparison of all these measures
for all specified alternatives to the proposed or final rule.   S. 343, but not H.R. 9,
would have directed EPA to  assess net benefits, net costs, and net effects on small
businesses. H.R. 9 would have mandated analysis of whether benefits would exceed
costs.  
S. 981, in the 105  Congress, would have added requirements to analyze theth
feasibility of using market-based mechanisms, the flexibility provided to local and state
governments and the regulated community, and the quality of information.  S. 981,
like S. 343 before it, specified certain principles of economic analysis.  
Regulatory Decision Criteria
Except for S. 1728 (105  Congress), all of the highlighted bills would haveth
established criteria for evaluating and choosing among regulatory options, based on
analytic results.  Excluding S. 1728, the bills would have established economic criteria
which are summarized in Table 1.  Both Johnston amendments, S. 343, and S. 981
would have directed EPA to consider whether benefits would justify costs.  The
CRS-7
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4) enacted by the 104  Congress7 th
requires federal agencies, except for independent regulatory boards and commissions, to
promulgate the alternative that is least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome, or to
explain why such an alternative was not adopted.
Johnston amendment to S. 2019 also would have required a rule to be most cost-
effective.  S. 343 would have required a rule to be most cost-effective or least-cost.
S. 981 would have required a determination as to whether the rule was most cost-
effective or provided the greatest net benefits.  Finally, H.R. 9 would have mandated
rules that were most cost-effective or provided more flexibility and that had
incremental benefits likely to justify and be reasonably related to the incremental
costs.  7
Table 1.  Decision Criteria Employed by Key Proposals in the 103 ,rd
104 , and 105  Congressesth th
Decision Criteria S. 171 S. 2019 S. 343 H.R. S. 981 S. 1728
9
Benefits justify costs X X X X
Most cost-effective X X X X
Least cost X
Greatest net benefits X
Flexible X
Incremental costs — X
incremental benefits
Effect on Existing Law
Arguably, the highlighted bills of the 103  and 105  Congresses would notrd th
have superseded other provisions of federal law,  such as the Clean Air Act or the
Safe Drinking Water Act, with regard to how EPA should weigh costs and risks in
developing regulations.  Neither would they have authorized EPA to employ risk-
based or economic criteria when implementing other statutes, some argued.
Nevertheless, this apparent neutrality with respect to existing law was made more
explicit, as time passed:  the amendment to S. 2019 was more explicit than that to S.
171; and in the 105  Congress, S. 981 provided still greater assurance that itsth
requirements would apply only to the extent that they were not inconsistent with
existing statutes.  However, the neutrality of proposed requirements relative to
existing statutory requirements never was stated absolutely clearly, according to some
observers. S. 1728 would not have established decision criteria, so its analytic
requirements apparently would not have conflicted with existing legal requirements.
In contrast, S. 343 explicitly would have prohibited promulgation of a rule
unless decision criteria were met (that is, benefits justified costs, and the rule was the
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most cost-effective or least-cost alternative).  Similarly, H.R. 9 Division D would
have superseded provisions of existing laws and prohibited promulgation of a major
rule, unless incremental benefits were likely to justify and be reasonably related to the
incremental costs, and alternatives were either less cost-effective or provided less
flexibility to regulated entities or local or state governments. 
Coordination and Quality Control
Executive Oversight.  OMB has been overseeing cost-benefit analyses of
regulations under the authority of executive orders since President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12291 in 1981.  In contrast, OMB has no clear authority to oversee
risk analyses, except to the extent that they underlie benefit analyses for regulations
under review. 
Three of the bills highlighted in this report (S. 343, H.R. 9, and S. 981) would
have authorized executive branch oversight of agencies’ regulatory analyses and
mandated issuance of guidance for the conduct of economic and risk analyses.  Two
(H.R. 9 and S. 981) would have assigned these tasks to OMB.  Only economic
analyses of regulations would have been reviewed under H.R. 9, but OMB would
have been required to approve or comment on a final cost-benefit analysis prior to
promulgation of a major rule.  S. 981 would have authorized OMB oversight for risk
assessments and peer review, as well as economic analyses. H.R. 9 would have
required OMB to evaluate federal agencies’ rulemaking procedures, while S. 981
would have directed OMB to evaluate agencies’ cost-benefit and risk analyses
periodically.
As a check on the new statutory authority of OMB to oversee regulatory
proposals, S. 981 and H.R. 9 would have limited the time for OMB review to 90 days,
while S. 343 permitted only 30 days, but all three bills would have allowed the period
to be extended.  In addition, S. 981 would have required public disclosure of any
changes to regulatory proposals that resulted from the review, and a written record
of relevant contacts OMB had with the regulatory agency and persons outside the
executive branch.  H.R. 9 also required a written record of relevant contacts made
with persons outside the agency. 
Peer Review.  Peer review was another mechanism proposed to ensure the
quality of agencies’ analytic work and the scientific soundness of decisions.  S. 343
in the 104  Congress, relied most heavily on peer review, as it would have requiredth
peer review of agencies’ analyses for major new rules, reviews of analyses for
existing rules, risk estimates supporting database entries, and clean-up plans for
hazardous waste sites.  Also in the 104  Congress, H.R. 9 would have required peerth
review of analyses for major rules worth at least $100 million and of other analyses
designated by OMB.  In the 105  Congress, S. 981 would have required peer reviewth
only for major rules.  Neither the Johnston amendments in the 103  Congress nor S.rd
1728 in the 105   had any provision regarding peer review or oversight by theth
executive branch of government.  
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Other Provisions
Deadlines.  Statutory and judicial deadlines for promulgation of rules were
treated in various ways by the bills of interest.  The original Johnston amendment was
silent on the subject of deadlines.  Risk analysis requirements imposed by the Johnston
amendment to S. 2019 and H.R. 9 would have been waived or deferred when there
was a conflicting statutory or judicial deadline.   In contrast, S. 343, S. 981, and S.
1728 would have suspended deadlines to allow compliance with requirements for
regulatory analysis. 
Review of Rules.  Only S. 343, H.R. 9, and S. 981 would have required
agencies to review existing major rules.  Under S. 343, all existing rules would have
terminated in 7 years unless they were reviewed by the administering agency.  
Citizen Petitions.  Bills in the 104  Congress would have authorized citizenth
petitions for judicial review of agency compliance with analytic requirements.   In
addition, S. 343 would have provided broad authority for citizen petitions to force
agencies to examine and redesign rules so that they conformed to decision criteria.
Bills in the 103  and 105  Congresses did not provide for citizen petitions.  rd th
Judicial Review.   Proposals differed widely in their treatment of judicial
review.  The Johnston amendments in the 103  Congress would not have subjectedrd
either the compliance of agencies with analytic requirements nor the analyses
themselves to judicial review.  
In the 104  Congress, S. 343, as reported, would have subjected all agencyth
decisions regarding rules, orders, petitions, licenses, sanctions, or relief to judicial
review, and it would have established a new set of standards for judicial review,
including that there is “substantial support in the rulemaking file for the factual basis
of agency actions.”  H.R. 9 Division D would have directed courts to consider agency
actions unlawful solely on the basis of a significant risk characterization or risk
analysis in the rulemaking record that did not substantially comply with the proposed
requirements. 
In the 105  Congress, S. 981, as reported, would have permitted review ofth
agency compliance with analytic requirements only in connection with review of a
final agency action.  S. 1728 also would have subjected to judicial review agency
decisions about which rules are major, and agency risk analyses in connection with
review of a final agency action.  Both bills in the 105  Congress would have requiredth
only that the rule not be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion (or
unsupported by substantial evidence where that standard otherwise was provided by
law), that the agency performed requisite analyses, and (under S. 1728), that
designation of a rule not be “clearly and convincingly” erroneous.   
Risk-Based Priorities.  Several of the highlighted bills would have promoted
use of analytic results to prioritize regulatory efforts within agencies:  S. 343 would
have required agencies to reflect risk-based priorities in annual budget requests; H.R.
9 would have required that relative risks and cost-effective risk reduction strategies
be identified within regulatory programs; and S. 981 would have required agencies to
inform annual budgets and strategic plans and performance plans with the results of
CRS-10
However, S. 2019 Section 15 would require a report of the relative risk of various8
sources of pollution and of the costs and benefits of risk reduction strategies.
a study by a scientific institution of relative risks and strategies for reducing them.  S.
1728 in the 105  Congress had no comparable provision, and the Johnstonth
amendments in the 103  Congress did not mention the setting of priorities.   rd 8
Conclusion
A comparison of selected provisions of key legislative proposals mandating
risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulations indicates that
proposals broadened in scope to encompass more federal agencies and more kinds of
agency activities.  At the same time, the more recent proposals apply to a smaller
fraction of promulgated rules that are “major,” often defined as a rule with an annual
cost of at least $100 million.  
Most of the highlighted bills would have required economic analysis, as well
as risk analysis, and would have established economic criteria for choosing among
regulatory options.  The preferred option typically was the most cost-effective
alternative and one that would have produced benefits justifying costs.  Such
requirements became more specific and increased in number between 1993 and 1998.
Proposals also became more complex as legislators tried to ensure that
unintended adverse consequences of an overarching mandate (e.g., delayed
rulemaking in emergencies) would be avoided.  Thus, each Congress considered more
exceptions and caveats for analytic requirements and decision rules.  At the same time
(perhaps to compensate), proposals included more mechanisms to ensure the quality
of analyses.  Compared to key proposals in the 104  Congress, the moreth
comprehensive proposal in the 105  Congress, S. 981, as reported, would haveth
reduced reliance on judicial review while leaning more heavily on peer review and
executive oversight of analyses.  Executive branch reviews of agencies' rules generally
would have been limited to 90 days and the substance of communications between
OMB and the regulatory agency or between OMB and anyone outside of government
about rules under review would have had to be disclosed to the public.
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      Because the report omits specific provisions that modify general requirements of the highlighted sections, reference to the bills themselves is advisable. 9
      The affected agencies are:  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Department of Energy10
(DOE), Department of Interior (DOI), Department of Transportation (DOT), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), and other agencies designated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Table 2.  Cost-Benefit Analysis in the 103 , 104 , and 105  Congressesrd th th 9
Provision 103  Congress 104  Congress 104  Congress 105  Congress 105  Congressrd
Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Affected Agencies U.S. Environmental All federal agencies Rulemaking: All federal All federal agencies All federal agencies
Protection Agency (EPA) agencies
Risk analysis:  EPA,
ACOE, CPSC, DOE,
DOI, DOT, FDA, MSHA,
NOAA, NRC, OSHA,
USDA, and other agen-
cies designated by OMB10
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Provision 103  Congress 104  Congress 104  Congress 105  Congress 105  Congressrd
Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
      Substantive rules are those rules for which agencies are required to provide public notice of rulemaking and opportunity for public comment under the Administrative11
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553).  They exclude rules pertaining to military or foreign affairs, agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts.  Except when notice and comment is otherwise required by law, this category also excludes interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice, and rules for which the agency finds for good cause that notice and public comment procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest.
Rules and Other S. 171 — Final rules Varies section by section., Division C — Substantive rules, excluding Substantive rules the
Products or relating to human health but generally applies to all Substantive rules, rules required to be issued primary purpose of which
Activities Affected and safety or the generally applicable rules, excluding rules issued in annually; authorizing is to address health,
environment including substantive an emergency, under a introduction into commerce safety, or environmental
S. 2019  — Proposed and or rules of agency organi- tax laws or international issued by the Federal rules excluded by S. 981,
final major rules relating zation, procedure, or sanctions Election Commission or in except does not exclude
to human health or the practice that alter or create some cases by the Federal rules authorizing
environment rights or obligations of Division D — Generally Communications introduction into
rules ; interpretive rules deadline, or to implement of food, drugs, or cosmetics; risks; excludes the same11
persons outside the applicable rules, Commission; or affecting commerce of food, drugs,
agency; and rules per- including substantive tax, monetary policy, or cosmetics 
taining to agency acquisi- rules; excepts rules security brokers and
tion, management, or dis- issued in an emergency, dealers, or bank safety or Risk analyses for major
posal of property or ser- approving food, drug or soundness rules relating to human
vices if not by GSA other product labels, health or the environment
procedures; excepts rules approving state programs, Economic analyses of new and for rules that result in
pertaining to military or or relating to military major rules  a significant substitution




Provision 103  Congress 104  Congress 104  Congress 105  Congress 105  Congressrd
Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
      This would be a new authority for OMB.  Current practice and provisions proposed in all the above abstracted bills from the 104  and 105  Congresses provide OMB12 th th
with the authority to designate rules to be treated as  major, but no other bill confers such power with respect to risk analyses.  
Affected Activities Policy statements that




new major rules, cleanup
plans, and reviews of
existing rules; excepts
analyses in emergencies,
for rules authorizing or
recognizing a commercial
product, for inspecting or
permitting facilities,
registering pesticides,
reviewing toxicity permitting facilities,
information for
commercial chemicals,
setting limits for pesticide
residues in food, screening





risks, excluding those that





Risk analyses and Risk analyses in
communications in connection with
support of major rules
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Major Rules S. 171 — Not Covered rules with Division C — Substantive rules Same as S. 981 
applicable an estimated cost of Substantive rules likely to have a gross
S. 2019 — Rules in a year, or with annual effect on the million or more, or to
that may have an specified significant economy of $50 result in other
effect on the adverse effects on million or more, specified significant
economy of $100 economic activity, major increases in adverse effects on
million or more in innovation, health, costs or prices, or economic activity,
any one year safety, or the significant adverse innovation, public
$50 million or more likely to result in an annual cost of $100
environment; effects on economic health, safety, the
excluding tax rules activity or environment, state,
and  rules approving innovation local, or tribal
or removing a governments, or
product in Division D — communities
commerce Rules likely to
result in an annual






Provision 103  Congress 104  Congress 104  Congress 105  Congress 105  Congressrd
Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Mandates for S. 171 — For final For proposed and Division C — For For major new rules, No provision
Economic rules relating to final major rules, major proposed or agencies must
Analysis health and safety or major cleanup plans, final rules, agencies analyze benefits;
the environment; and existing rules must analyze costs, costs; benefits
agencies must being reviewed, benefits, and relative to costs;
analyze costs, agencies must distribution of costs cost-effectiveness;
benefits, and analyze costs, and benefits for the net benefits; a
whether benefits benefits, incremental proposal and less- reasonable number of
will justify costs costs and benefits, cost alternatives reasonable
S. 2019 — For all alternatives, each proposed or market-based
major proposed and cumulative final major rule, mechanisms;
final rules relating compliance burden, agencies must flexibility provided to
to human health net effect on small analyze incremental local and state
and the businesses, whether costs governments and the
environment, benefits justify and benefits of the regulated community;
agencies must costs, and whether rule and alternatives and  quality of
analyze costs and greater net information 
benefits to benefits or lower net For each final major
governments and costs are achieved; rule, agencies must
the private sector; also must describe analyze whether
cost-effectiveness persons who are benefits are likely
of the rule and likely to benefit and to exceed costs,
alternatives; and to bear the cost and effects on small
whether benefits businesses, net
justify costs employment, and
feasibility of alternatives;
specified Division D — For feasibility of using
cumulative financial
compliance burden
Principles of No provision Specifies principles No provision Specifies principles No provision
Economic of economic analysis of economic analysis
Analysis
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Mandates for S. 171 — Agencies For new major For all proposed or For proposed and For proposed and
Risk Analyses must analyze a rules, major final major rules final major rules the final major rules the
rule’s effect on environmental designed to protect primary purpose of primary purpose of
health or the cleanup plans, and health, safety, or which is to address which is to address
environment; reviews of existing the environment, health, safety, or health, safety, or
estimate risk to rules, agencies must agencies must environmental risk, environmental risk,
individuals; and analyze risks, data assess incremental agencies must agencies must
compare risks quality, and risk reduction, analyze risk and analyze risk to
S. 2019  — reduction, and must known substitution exposed populations, populations, or
Agencies must compare risks risks, and subpopulations, or natural resources,
analyze risks to comparable risks natural resources, including
human health,  and must compare substitution risks







for at least 6 other
hazards
incremental risk distribution of risks, distribution of risk to exposed individuals,
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Principles of No provision Specifies principles Specifies principles Specifies principles Specifies principles
Risk of risk assessment of risk assessment of risk assessment of risk assessment
Assessment and risk and risk and risk and
and Risk characterizations characterizations characterizations characterizations
Characterizati
on Risk analyses for Agencies must Agencies must Agencies must
major rules must be analyze analyze uncertainties, analyze
plausible and uncertainties, variabilities, uncertainties,
realistic conflicting data, conflicting data, variabili-ties, and
For human health scientifically assumptions; consider reliable
risk analysis for a objective and consider “all relevant, and reasonably
major rule, agencies unbiased; and rely reliable, and available scientific
must use: the most on scientific reasonably available information and
scientifically findings and scientific promote rational
plausible model; consider all relevant information”; be and informed risk
best estimates; and scientific data objective and management
probabilistic systematic, and decisions and
descriptions of Agencies must carefully analyze the informed public
uncertainty and express risk as a weight of the participation; and
variability; data reasonable range of scientific evidence provide for public
must be developed estimates, including input to the process
in accord with - a best estimate; Agencies must revise
promulgated stan- distinguish assumptions to Agencies must
dards for  toxic scientific findings incorporate new express risk
substances and from other relevant and reliable estimates as
pesticide tests considerations and scientific information reasonable ranges
and assumptions; be inferences, and assumptions;
for human health as it becomes or probability
risk assessments, reasonably available distributions, 
discuss conflicting including the most
data Agencies must plausible risk
express risk estimates estimates for the
as reasonable ranges general population
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Certification S. 171 — For each No provision For each final rule, For each major rule, No provision
final rule EPA must an agency must an agency must
certify that:  the certify that: certify: its
estimate and analyses are based compliance with
analysis are based on objective and rulemaking
upon “a scientific unbiased scientific procedures and the
evaluation of the and economic satisfaction of
risk” and supported evaluation of all decision criteria, or
by the “best information an explanation of
available scientific provided; why certification
data”; the rule will incremental benefits cannot be made
substantially are likely to justify
increase health or and be reasonably
environmental related to the
protection; and the incremental costs;
rule will produce and alternatives are
benefits that will either less cost-
justify the costs effective or provide
S. 2019 — For regulated entities or
each proposed and local or state




must certify that: 
the analyses are
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Decision S. 171 — Benefits Potential benefits Prohibits adoption Whether a rule is No provision
Criteria for will justify costs justify potential of a final rule likely to be most
Rules costs without cost-effective or to
S. 2019 — Likely certification that— provide the greatest
benefits will justify Rule is the most incremental benefits net benefits
costs, and rule is cost-effective or are likely to justify
most cost-effective least-cost alternative and be reasonably Whether likely
alternative allowed related to the benefits will justify
by law Rule does not incremental costs, costs
disapprove a and
product on the basis rule is most cost-
of safety if it effective or
presents a negligible provides more
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Effect on S. 171 — Prohibits Requires agencies Requirements apply Adds new
Implementatio Certification promulgation of a to consider analyses to the extent that requirements to
n of Existing requirement does rule unless decision required by they are not rulemaking under
Laws not amend, modify, criteria are met; Division C only “to inconsistent with existing statutes and
or alter any statute decision criteria extent permitted by existing statutes apparently would
S. 2019 — Does statutory requirements
not affect any other requirements Rulemaking conflicted
provision of federal provisions of
law or authorize Notice and Division D
EPA consideration comment supersede
of additional procedures apply to provisions of
factors in its rules under statutes existing laws
decisions not generally subject authorizing
supplement existing law” supersede them if
to 5 U.S.C. 553 regulatory activities
Requires analysis of health safety, or the
an alternative to a environment
cleanup plan only if






a product on the
basis of safety if it
poses a negligible
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as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Executive No provision Executive branch  OMB may review OMB must establish No provision
Coordination must develop draft and final a process to review
and Oversight uniform procedures economic analyses and coordinate
of Agency for regulatory and rules; limits agency regulatory
Analyses analysis and oversee time for review to actions; limits time
agency 90 days; OMB for review to 90
implementation; must approve of, or days, but allows
limits time for comment on, final extension
review of proposed economic analyses
or final regulations for major rules
to 30 days, which
may be extended
President must issue  with the Council of
guidance for risk Economic Advisors
analysis, and OMB (CEA), the Director
must issue guidance of the Office of
for cost-benefit Science and
analysis Technology Policy
Agencies must made from the
maintain a preliminary risk Agencies must
rulemaking file analysis in the final disclose changes to
containing copies of regulatory impact regulatory proposals
all material that analysis that result from
pertains directly to OMB review
the rulemaking that
was available to the
Similar to S. 343 OMB, in consultation
Agencies must risk assessments, and
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th th th th
      This provision was enacted by the 104  Congress in Public Law 104-121.13 th
Congressional No provision Agencies must No provision No provision No provision
Review of submit final
Agency regulations to
Rulemaking Congress, which
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th th th th
Peer Review No provision Covered agencies Agencies must have Agencies must No provision
must have uniform independent, arrange for
peer review external peer independent peer
procedures; peer review programs; review by broadly
review panels must review panels must representative expert
include a  balanced be balanced and not groups; panels must
group of experts exclude those with adhere to agency
representing all a potential interest standards and
interests and not in the outcome, if practices governing
exclude those with a disclosed, unless a conflicts of interest
potential interest in single entity is
the outcome, if affected by a Federal Advisory
disclosed, unless a regulatory decision Committee Act does
single entity is not apply to peer
affected by a Requires peer review 
regulatory decision; review of risk
excludes people analyses and Requires peer review
associated with economic analyses of risk analyses and
generation of the for major rules with cost-benefit analyses
work being an impact of at least of major rules likely
reviewed; requires $100 million, and of to have an annual
reporting of any analysis likely effect of $100 million
minority views to have a significant or more 
Federal Advisory policy decisions, if Agency must publish
Committee Act ordered by OMB a statement by a
(FACA) applies to federal official from
peer review panels A National Peer outside the agency
impact on public
Review Panel must indicating that review
annually review participants were
agencies’ cost independent and
assessment expert and that the
practices agency has
CRS-24
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Peer Review Requires peer




















Deadlines S. 171 — No Suspends judicial Agencies may During the first 2 Same as S. 981
provision and statutory promulgate a rule years after
S. 2019 — Action rulemaking until economic analyses statutory and judicial
required to meet a requirements for required by deadlines for
statutory or judicial regulatory analysis Division C if rulemaking for 6
deadline shall not are met analysis conflicts months or until
be delayed with deadlines requirements for
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Johnston Amendments, S. 343, as reported by H.R. 9, as passed by the S. 981, as reported S. 1728, as introduced
as passed by the Senate the Judiciary Committee House
th th th th
Review of No provision Agencies must Division D — Agencies must No provision
Existing Rules review all existing Agencies may set review existing major
major rules, rules priorities and rules as necessary
that are inconsistent procedures for
with this Act, and review, revision,
rules designated by and repeal of major
the President; rules promulgated
existing rules would prior to the
terminate in 7 years, effective date of the
new rules in 5 years, Act
unless reviewed
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Citizen No provision Citizens may Citizens may No provision No provision
Petitions petition for judicial petition for judicial
review of agency review of agency
analysis and compliance with
certification of a Division C analytic















benefit analysis of a
major rule; review
of a risk assessment
or cost-benefit
analysis for a major
rule or major
cleanup plan; and
review of any risk
assessment or any
entry on an agency-
developed database
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Actions S. 171 — Subjects to judicial Division C — Permits judicial Subjects to judicial
Subject to Certification is not review all agency Subjects agency review of agency review agency (but
Judicial subject to judicial decisions (and any analyses regarding compliance with not OMB)
Review review; no cause of failure to make such the effect of a rule requirements for designations of
action is granted to decisions) to issue, on small entities to regulatory analysis rules as major or
any person grant, or deny rules, judicial review in only in connection not major 
S. 2019 — Does licenses, sanctions, promulgation of a agency action Subjects risk
not create any right or relief major rule assessments to
or benefit, Subjects to judicial judicial review
substantive or Subjects to judicial Division D — review agencies’ when final rules are
procedural; review agencies’ Subjects agency regulatory flexibility reviewed
adequacy of regulatory flexibility compliance with analysis and
certification or analysis and analytic certification  
alleged failure to certification requirements to regarding impact of a
comply is not regarding impact of judicial review rule on small entities
grounds for a rule on small under the
invalidating a major entities authorizing statute
rule and the
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Standard of No provision Whether there is Division D — Whether the cost- Whether the
Judicial substantial support Whether agencies benefit designation of a
Review in the rulemaking substantially determination, risk rule as major or
file for the factual complied with the assessment, or peer non-major clearly
basis of agency principles for risk review was wholly and convincingly is
actions, findings, or assessment and omitted shown to be
conclusions; characterization erroneous
whether agencies Whether the final rule
observed procedural is arbitrary, Whether the final
requirements; capricious, an abuse rule is arbitrary or
whether statutory of discretion, or is capricious
authority was unsupported by
exceeded; or substantial evidence Whether an agency
whether the agency where that standard failed to perform a
interpreted the rule is otherwise provided required risk




agency to design a
rule with benefits
that justified costs
and that would be
more cost-effective
or less costly 
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Risk-Based No provision Agencies must The President must OMB must contract No provision
Priorities reflect risk-based identify relative with a scientific
priorities in annual risks and cost- institution to
budget requests effective risk compare risks to
reduction strategies human health, safety,
and  opportunities and the environment;
and obstacles to to study
reflecting priorities methodologies for
within regulatory comparing dissimilar
programs to protect risks; and to
health in a cost- recommend how to
effective and cost- set priorities for
reasonable manner reducing risks
Agencies must use
the results of the
study to inform their
annual budgets and
strategic plans and
performance plans
